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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between nursing home quality and financial performance to assess whether there is a
business case for quality. Secondary data sources included the Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR), Certification
and Survey Provider Enhanced Reporting (CASPER), Medicare Cost Reports, Minimum Data Set (MDS 2.0), Area Resource
File (ARF), and LTCFocus for all free-standing, nongovernment nursing homes for 2000 to 2014. Data were analyzed using
panel data linear regression with facility and year fixed effects. The dependent variable, financial performance, consisted of the
operating margin. The independent variables comprised nursing home quality measures that capture the three dimensions of
Donabedian’s structure-process-outcomes framework: structure Registered Nurse (RN) hours per resident day, Licensed
Practical Nurse (LPN) hours per resident day, Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) hours per resident day, RN skill mix),
process (facility-acquired restraints, facility-acquired catheters, pressure ulcer prevention, and restorative ambulation), and
outcomes (facility-acquired contractures, facility-acquired pressure ulcers, hospitalizations per resident, rehospitalizations, and
health deficiencies). Control variables included size, average acuity index, market competition, per capita income, and Medicare
Advantage penetration rate. This study found that the operating margin was lower in nursing homes that reported higher
LPN hours per resident day and higher RN skill mix (structure); higher use of catheters, lower pressure ulcer prevention, and
lower restorative ambulation (process); and more residents with contractures, pressure ulcers, hospitalizations and health
deficiencies (outcomes). The results suggest that there is a business case for quality, whereas nursing homes that have better
processes and outcomes of care perform better financially.
Keywords
nursing homes, financial performance, quality, structure-process-outcome

What do we already know about this topic?
Weech-Maldonado and colleagues (2003) reported that nursing homes that had higher quality of care were able to lower
resident costs contributing to superior financial performance; however, these studies were limited to a cross-sectional
analysis of a limited state sample from 1996.
How does your research contribute to the field?
This study contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between nursing home financial performance
(operating margin) and quality using a national longitudinal database (2000-2014) and an expanded set of structure,
process, and outcome measures of quality.
What are your research’s implications toward theory, practice, or policy?
Producing a high quality of care may allow nursing homes to become more efficient, or it may allow the nursing home
to have higher revenues due to higher quality, which can ultimately improve financial performance.

Introduction
Nursing homes face constant challenges delivering highquality care to high-need residents in a competitive and
highly regulated environment. The industry faces multiple

challenges, including the growing number of substitutes and
rivals, shifting resident and payer mix, changes in reimbursement policies, demands for accountability and transparency, and greater federal and state regulation.1 Nursing
homes must balance the challenge of delivering high-quality
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care while remaining financially solvent in this turbulent
environment. But are profits and quality necessarily antagonistic as widely understood, or is there is a business case
quality? This is the question explored in this study.
Nursing homes must be able to balance quality care
with financial performance because as the health care
adage goes “no margin, no mission.” Poor financial performance has been associated with organizational failure and
closure in nursing homes.2,3 Nursing home industry revenues have been adversely affected by changes in state and
federal reimbursement policies, falling occupancy, and
changing payer mix.1 At the same time, the cost of delivering resident care has increased due to nurse staffing mandates, liability insurance costs, and worsening resident
acuity,4 placing the nursing home industry in a precarious
financial situation.
A commonly held notion is that higher quality may be
associated with higher costs,5 yet quality of care and financial performance should not be viewed as incompatible
goals.6 For instance, the quality improvement movement
posits that improvements in quality and reductions of costs
can be achieved simultaneously through more efficient and
streamlined processes of delivering care.5,7,8 Yet the typical
cost function of economic theory postulates that greater
quality of care is associated with greater costs.9
The existing health services research literature provides
some evidence that the association between financial performance and quality may be more nuanced.10,11 Within the
nursing home industry, Weech-Maldonado and colleagues6,12
have reported that nursing homes that had higher quality of
care were able to lower resident costs contributing to superior financial performance. However, these studies6,12 were
limited to a cross-sectional analysis of a limited state sample
from 1996. Parker and Werner13 found that quality was positively associated with financial performance, but only after
Nursing Home Compare public reporting requirements went
into effect in 2002. However, this study was limited to a
small number of quality measures and data through 2006.
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between nursing home financial performance (operating margin) and quality using a national
longitudinal database (2000-2014) and an expanded set of
structure, process, and outcome measures of quality.
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Quality: A Structure-Process-Outcome Perspective
Before we discuss the relationship between quality and financial performance, it is important to define quality.
Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome (SPO) framework
is commonly used in quality assessment. According to the
SPO framework, when good structure is in place, it will lead
to better processes and ultimately better outcomes.14 Structure
is defined as the environment where care is provided and the
attributes of the health care setting where care is delivered.15
The structure of the health care setting can have a direct influence on patient outcomes. Nurse staffing is an important
structural indicator of quality.16 Nursing homes typically
employ 3 different types of nursing staff: RNs, LPNs, and
CNAs. There are 2 measures of nurse staffing patterns: nurse
staffing intensity and RN skill mix. Nurse staffing intensity
refers to the number of nursing hours per resident day.
Research suggests a positive association between nurse staffing intensity (especially for registered nurses) and resident
outcomes within nursing homes.17,18 In a systematic review of
nursing home staffing, Bostick and colleagues19 concluded
that “there is a proven association between higher total staffing levels (especially licensed staff) and improved quality of
care.” RN skill mix is measured as the ratio of RN full-time
equivalents (FTEs) to total licensed nurse staffing (RN FTEs
plus LPN FTEs). Skill mix assesses the availability of more
skilled nursing staff and the degree of RN supervision. Lower
RN skill mix may result in higher workloads for RNs, as
LPNs and CNAs are less autonomous in their functioning.20
RN skill mix has been found to have an independent effect on
quality of care.21
Process refers to any actions that are directly performed
on the resident throughout the delivery of their care.22 Process
indicators indicate what is being done to the resident but may
not capture its appropriateness. This article will focus on 4
nursing home process variables: utilization of urethral catheters, use of restraints, pressure ulcer prevention, and restorative ambulation.
Outcomes are defined as the states or levels of well-being
which result from care processes.15 Good structures and processes may directly affect positive outcomes.18 The outcome
variables explored in this study are facility-acquired contractures, facility-acquired pressure ulcers, hospitalizations,
rehospitalizations, and health deficiencies.
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Conceptual framework. Financial performance or profitability
is the result of revenues and costs, and organizations may
improve profitability by increasing revenues, decreasing
costs, or both. Using tenets from economic theory and strategic management, we posit that nursing homes with better
quality will be able to achieve improved financial performance through reduced costs, increased revenues, or both.
The cost function of economic theory portrays the relationship between average costs and the rate of production or
output.23 However, different providers may have different
cost functions based on their level of productivity, or how
effectively input resources (ie, labor, supplies, technology)
are transformed into outputs (ie, patient days). Providers can
increase their productivity through improved processes
aimed at reducing input resources (labor and materials)
required to produce a unit of output, which can result in
lower costs. One of the most effective ways to increase productivity is through processes aimed at prevention of defects
or poor quality of care. In this case, productivity improves
because of less waste (scrap) and rework.24 As such, nursing
homes may be able to increase their productivity and lower
costs through higher quality, or improved processes and outcomes of care, as a result of reduced rework and waste.
On the revenue side, the demand function of economic
theory represents the relationship between output and price.
Organizational reputation for delivering high-quality services may decrease the elasticity of demand, which can
allow firms to charge higher prices, and as a result earn
higher revenues.25 This would also be in line with the principles of Porter’s Product Differentiation Strategy, whereas
organizations may choose to focus on quality to distinguish
themselves from the competition.26 By producing a highquality product, a business may be shielded from competitive pressures by creating loyal customers and decreasing
customer sensitivity to price.12
In efforts to improve nursing home competition based on
quality, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) began public reporting of quality of US nursing
homes through its Web site Nursing Home Compare in
2002.27 This includes data on nurse staffing, clinical quality
measures, and inspection results. This allows consumers or
their agents, such as family members, providers, employers,
and insurers, to use publicly reported quality information to
search and select nursing homes with higher quality. This
market-based reform has been found to be effective in
increasing the demand for high-quality care, as well as incentivizing providers to improve the quality of care.28 As such,
nursing homes may choose a differentiation strategy based
on quality as a competitive strategy.
Hypotheses. Nursing hours are an input resource into the
production of nursing home care. As such, changes in nurse
staffing patterns can influence costs and thus may have an
important impact on financial performance.29 Medicaid is
the largest payer of nursing home care but its reimbursement
rates are approximately 20% lower than private pay rates,30
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and facilities are generally not compensated for higher staffing beyond statutory requirements. Compensation also varies
significantly among different nurse skill mixes. In 2012, RN
nurses in nursing homes reported an average annual salary of
$61 220, while LPNs and CNAs reported annual salaries of
$43 570 and $24 650, respectively.31 As such, an increase in
RN intensity and skill mix may significantly increase costs.
On the contrary, increased RN intensity and skill mix may
result in lower costs through better processes and outcomes of
care. For example, prior research has shown that increased RN
staffing can result in lower costs through its positive effect on
outcomes.12 Furthermore, nursing homes may choose to
improve their nurse staffing patterns as part of a differentiation
strategy. And as previously noted, this may result in improved
revenues as a result of greater resident satisfaction and lower
sensitivity to price. Finally, states have been implementing
nursing home pay-for-performance systems for Medicaid
reimbursement, which incentivize increased RN staffing.32
Nursing homes in these states may increase RN staffing as a
mechanism to improve their Medicaid reimbursement.33
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Nursing homes with better structural quality (higher RN staff intensity and RN skill mix) will experience higher financial performance.
As previously noted, higher quality does not necessarily
lead to higher costs.34 Improved quality, achieved through
innovative or efficient care processes, may result in fewer
defects and/or avoidable complications, which, in turn, will
lower the amount of waste or rework, thereby reducing the
costs of delivering care.35 As such, nursing homes that produce
higher process quality care may be able to reduce costs and
ultimately have better financial performance. For example,
nursing homes that engage in pressure ulcer prevention may
experience short-term higher costs as a result of increased CNA
staffing use; however, in the long-term, the facility may still be
able to experience lower costs as a result of lower incidence of
pressure ulcer and pressure ulcer treatment costs. On the contrary, nursing homes that do not focus on efficient and effective
ways of delivering care may have wasteful processes that will
contribute to worse financial performance. High-quality processes will also reflect a better utilization of the organization’s
staffing. Conversely, nursing homes with poor quality processes could be seen as inefficient in their delivery of care and
may be associated with poor financial performance.
Hypothesis 2: Nursing homes with higher process quality
will experience better financial performance.
Better resident outcomes not only may result in lower
costs but also may provide the opportunity to generate higher
revenues. A differentiation strategy focused on quality may
be particularly important as nursing homes face stiffer competition for private pay residents. Nursing homes’ occupancy
rates have declined from 86% in 2004 to 81% in 2016, as
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consumers seek alternatives sources of long-term care, such
as assisted living and home- and community-based services.36 As such, nursing homes are increasingly competing
for a dwindling number of private-paid residents. Nursing
homes may use quality as a way to differentiate themselves
given the public reporting of quality measures.
Nursing homes may also compete based on quality in the
postacute care market. Postacute care with its higher reimbursement rates is becoming increasingly important for nursing homes.37 Medicare and Medicare Advantage average per
diem rates of $503 and $433, respectively, are more than
double those of Medicaid.38 From 1994 to 2009, postacute
care expenses increased approximately 27%, and spending at
nursing homes represented the largest portion of that growth.39
Nursing homes may increase their RN staffing to attract postacute care residents,40 and increased RN staffing can have an
effect on the overall quality of nursing homes. Similarly,
nursing homes may engage in quality improvement activities
as a mechanism to address consumer demand for higher quality nursing homes after public reporting of quality.28
Finally, while nursing homes may not compete based on
quality to attract Medicaid residents, states have been implementing pay-for-performance systems for Medicaid reimbursement, targeting process and outcomes of care, such as
use of restraints and pressure ulcers.32 In these states, nursing home efforts to improve quality may also result in
increased reimbursement rates. Therefore, we hypothesize
the following:
Hypothesis 3: Nursing homes with higher outcomes
quality will experience better financial performance

Methods
Data
The data for this study come from 6 different sources:
Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data
file; its successor, the Certification and Survey Provider
Enhanced Reporting (CASPER); Medicare Cost Reports;
Minimum Data Set Plus (MDS 2.0); the Area Resource File
(ARF); and Brown University’s LTCFocus data set. OSCAR/
CASPER provides data on facility characteristics, staffing,
and operations. The information contained in OSCAR/
CASPER is routinely collected through the Medicare and
Medicaid certification process and is updated annually. The
Medicare Cost Reports provide financial and resident utilization data for nursing homes receiving Medicare reimbursement. The MDS 2.0 contains demographic information
on residents, as well as standardized assessment items on
activities of daily living (ADL), behavioral/emotional problems, oral/nutritional status, skin condition, treatments, and
medications. Each resident is assessed upon admission to a
nursing home and then each quarter subsequently. The ARF
contains information on the socioeconomic and market

characteristics at the county level. LTCFocus is an aggregated data set that has data from a variety of primary and
secondary sources, including MDS, CMS’s Nursing Home
Compare, ARF, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Residential
History File, OSCAR/CASPER and state policy surveys.

Study Group
The study uses a national population of nursing homes of
approximately 16 500 facilities per year. Hospital-based
facilities (approximately 2200 facilities a year) were
removed from the study group because they may behave
differently from freestanding facilities due to their direct
ties with hospitals. Similarly, government facilities
(approximately 700 facilities a year) were also removed
from the study group because they are less amenable to
market forces compared with private facilities. The study
also excludes facilities with no Medicare beds (approximately 2300 facilities a year), because financial data were
only available for facilities with Medicare cost reports.
Finally, cases with revenues and costs in excess of 5 standard deviations from the mean were excluded from the
study. The final study group consisted of 173 021 nursing
home-year observations for the years 2000 to 2014, or an
average of 11 535 facilities per year.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this analysis is operating
margin—a widely used financial measure which indicates
the entity’s operating profitability. Using the Medicare Cost
Report data, we calculated operating margin by first determining the adjusted operating costs, which consist of operating expenses less all capital costs (costs associated with
capital buildings, capital equipment, and interest). Once
adjusted operating costs were calculated, we determined the
operating margin as follows:
 net patient revenue − 
Operating margin = 

 adjusted operating costs 
/ net patient revenue.

Independent Variables
The independent variables consist of nursing home quality
measures that encompass all 3 dimensions of Donabedian’s
SPO framework. To address potential endogeneity between
quality and financial performance, we used lagged quality
variables as predictors.
Structural measures of quality
Nurse staffing intensity. This consists of RN hours per resident day, LPN hours per resident day, and CNA hours per
resident day.
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RN skill mix. This is operationalized as the ratio of the
number of RN FTEs to the number of RN FTEs plus LPN
FTEs.
Process measures of quality
Facility-acquired restraints. The use of physical restraints
in nursing homes has been actively discouraged in the
past 2 decades. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1986 mandated nursing homes to reduce the
use of restraints establishing that “residents have a right
to be free from . . . any physical or chemical restrains
imposed for the purposes of discipline or convenience.”41
The literature has linked use of restraints with numerous
deaths and injuries.42 The OSCAR/CASPER variable is
defined as the proportion of residents with restraints minus
those residents who had restraints upon admission to the
nursing home.43
Facility-acquired catheters. Urethral catheterization has been
found to place residents at greater risk for urinary tract infections and long-term complications including renal failure44,45
and has been used in previous research as an indicator of
poor quality.46 It is a CMS quality measure used in the Nursing Home Compare Web site. The OSCAR/CASPER variable was defined as the proportion of residents with catheters
minus those residents who had catheters upon admission to the
nursing home.43
Pressure sore prevention. This variable is constructed as
a facility composite score (0-4) of pressure sore prevention
processes derived from 4 MDS dichotomous (yes/no) items:
turning/repositioning program, pressure relieving seat, pressure relieving mattress, and ointment application. These 4
variables were selected based on factor analysis with Varimax rotation of all skin care processes captured by the MDS.
The pressure sore prevention composite had adequate internal consistency showing a Cronbach alpha of 0.82. Pressure
sore prevention is an important process indicator as nursing
home residents are highly susceptible to developing pressure
sores because of their limited mobility. Ensuring a regular
turning schedule reduces the likelihood of pressure sores.
Similarly, provision of a pressure relieving device distributes
pressure over a greater body surface area lowering the risk
of pressure sores.47
Restorative ambulation. This is a facility-level continuous
variable that measures the facility’s average number of days
in a week that residents are walked using restorative nursing aides. It is generated by dividing the resident-level MDS
restorative variable that represents the number of days, of 15
minutes or more of restorative ambulation, provided in the 7
days before the assessment date by the total number of residents in the facility. Nursing home residents on a restorative
program are more likely to maintain their functional mobility
because they walk on a regular basis.

Outcome measures of quality
Facility-acquired contractures. These abnormal manifestations occur when a muscle shortens or there is joint fixation. Contractures are commonly seen among persons with
immobility or central nervous system disorders48 and can
lead to functional disability, immobility, infections, and discomfort.49 The development of contractures is considered a
failure of the nursing home to meet federal quality of care
standards.49,50 The OSCAR/CASPER variable was defined
as the proportion of residents with contractures minus those
residents who had contractures upon admission to the nursing home.43
Facility-acquired pressure ulcers. These are injuries to the
skin and underlying tissue and have been used as an indicator
of nursing home quality.51 The OSCAR/CASPER variable
was defined as the proportion of residents with pressure
ulcers minus those residents who had pressure ulcers upon
admission to the nursing home.43
Hospitalizations. Nursing home hospitalizations not only
have a high financial cost to Medicare but they impose a high
personal cost on nursing home residents by increasing the
risks of complications and infections.52 The primary reasons
for hospitalizations include heart failure, electrolyte imbalance, respiratory infection, sepsis, and urinary tract infections. Many of these conditions can be promptly addressed
if the nursing home provides its residents effective care in an
infection-free environment.53-55 Hospitalizations are defined
in LTCFocus as the number of hospitalizations from the
facility in the calendar year for every 365 nursing home resident days.
Thirty-day SNF rehospitalization. The reduction in rehospitalizations of nursing home residents is considered an important policy goal as it reflects the quality of care the facility
delivers to its residents.56 Rehospitalization is defined in
LTCFocus as the proportion of residents admitted to skilled
nursing facility (SNF) who were rehospitalized directly from
SNF within 30 days of hospital discharge.
Health deficiencies. This represents a count measure of
the number of deficiencies cited in CMS’ State Operations
Manual.57 This OSCAR/CASPER measure includes all
health-related citations, such as inappropriate treatment to
prevent and treat pressure sores, urinary tract infections, resident freedom and significant medication errors but exclude
life safety violations that pertain to physical plant requirements.

Control Variables
Control variables include organizational and market variables that may be associated with financial and quality performance: size, average acuity index, Herfindahl-Hirschman
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables.

Financial performance
Operating margin (%)
Structure
RN hours per resident day
LPN hours per resident day
CNA hours per resident day
RN to nurse ratio
Process
Facility-acquired catheterization
Facility-acquired restraints
Pressure sore preventiona
Restorative ambulationa
Outcomes
Facility-acquired contractures
Facility-acquired bedsores
Hospitalizations per resident
Rehospitalizations
Health deficiencies
Control
Total beds
Average acuity index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Medicare Advantage (managed care) penetration rate

Mean

SD

N

9.98

9.36

173 021

0.36
0.79
2.19
0.30

0.51
0.62
0.98
0.18

171 093
170 975
170 796
171 114

0.02
0.04
1.46
1.96

0.03
0.07
0.85
2.31

122 572
122 572
94 051
94 051

0.11
0.03
0.91
15.42
5.95

0.14
0.04
0.48
10.88
5.55

122 572
122 572
155 265
158 296
145 812

113
11.26
0.24
$34 978
17.06

59
1.39
0.26
$11 430
15.17

171 124
171 124
139 320
139 406
139 658

Note. N= nursing home-year observation.
a
Data for these variables were available only from 2000 to 2009.

Index (HHI), per capita income, and Medicare Advantage
(MA) (managed care) penetration. Nursing home size is
measured by the number of beds. The acuity is a measure of
resident acuity at the facility level and it is based on resident
mobility and nursing factors. A facility with higher resident
acuity may have higher revenues but at the same time may
face higher costs than facilities with lower acuity. HHI, a
measure of competition at the county level, has been found to
influence quality and financial performance. It is defined as
the sum of the squares of market shares (based on beds) for
nursing homes in each county. Scores close to “0” represent
highly competitive markets, while scores of “1” represent a
monopolistic market. Per capita income was derived from
ARF at the county level and is used as a marker for socioeconomic conditions of the market which may influence both
nursing home quality and financial performance. The MA
penetration rate is the proportion of all Medicare beneficiaries in the county who are enrolled in a Medicare managed
care organization. Increased MA penetration may affect the
demand for postacute services and ultimately the financial
performance of nursing homes.

Analysis
This study utilized panel data linear regression with facility
fixed effects (FE) to examine the relationship between lagged

quality measures (SPO model) and financial performance
(operating margin). FE focuses on within-facility variations
in financial performance as a result of quality. As such, it
controls for time-invariant unobservable variables that may
explain between-facility differences.58 Finally, year FE are
included to control for time trends. The level of statistical
significance was set at alpha = 0.05. All analyses performed
using Stata 13.0 for Windows.
We ran 4 separate regression models for different quality
measures as independent variables: (1) structure: staffing
variables; (2) process: restraints and catheters; (3) process:
pressure ulcer prevention and restorative ambulation; and (4)
outcomes: contractures, pressure ulcers, hospitalizations,
30-day rehospitalization, and deficiencies. Two different
regression models were run for the process measures, because
data for pressure prevention and restorative ambulation were
only available from 2000 to 2009, while data for restraints
and catheters were available for the complete study period.

Results
Table 1 has the descriptive statistics for all the dependent
and independent variables. Tables 2 to 5 present the results
of the panel data linear regression. In terms of structural
quality measures, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Each
additional hour of LPN staffing per resident inpatient day
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Regression Analysis for the Relationship
Between Nursing Home Structure Quality and Financial
Performance (Operating Margin).

Table 5. Fixed Effects Regression Analysis for the Relationship
Between Nursing Home Outcomes Quality and Financial
Performance (Operating Margin).

Quality variables

Quality variables

Structure variables
RN hours per patient daya
LPN hours per patient daya
CNA hours per patient daya
RN skill mix
Control variables
Total beds
Average acuity index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Medicare Advantage (managed care)
penetration rate

Coefficient
−0.15
−0.34**
−0.06
−0.66*
0.01
−0.10***
−0.01
0.01***
0.01**

a

Variable lagged by 1 year.
*P ≤ .05. **P ≤ .01. ***P ≤ .001.

Process variables
Facility-acquired catheterizationa
Facility-acquired restraintsa
Control variables
Total beds
Average acuity index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Medicare Advantage (managed care)
penetration rate

Coefficient
−2.58**
−0.21
0.01*
−0.10***
−0.09
0.01***
0.01***

Variable lagged by 1 year.
*P ≤ .05. **P ≤ .01. ***P ≤ .001.

Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression Analysis for the Relationship
Between Nursing Home Process Quality and Financial
Performance (Operating Margin).

Process variables
Pressure sore preventiona
Restorative ambulationa
Control variables
Total beds
Average acuity index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Medicare Advantage (managed care)
penetration rate
a
Variable lagged by 1 year.
*P ≤ .05. **P ≤ .01. ***P ≤ .001.

0.01
−0.10**
−0.01
0.01***
0.01***

Variable lagged by 1 year.
*P ≤ .05. **P ≤ .01. ***P ≤ .001.

a

Quality variables

−0.84***
−3.93***
−0.22*
−0.01
−0.02***

a

Table 3. Fixed Effects Regression Analysis for the Relationship
Between Nursing Home Process Quality and Financial
Performance (Operating Margin).
Quality variables

Outcome variables
Facility-acquired contractures
Facility-acquired bedsores
Hospitalizations per resident
Rehospitalizations
Health deficiencies
Control variables
Total beds
Average acuity index
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Medicare Advantage (managed care)
penetration rate

Coefficient

Coefficient
0.15*
0.08***
0.01***
−0.07*
0.34
0.01***
0.01***

decreased operating margin by 0.3% (P < .01), and each
additional 10% increase in RN skill mix decreased operating margin by 0.1% (P < .05). On the contrary, RN and
CNA staffing intensity were not significantly associated
with financial performance. In terms of process quality measures, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Every 10%
increase in facility-acquired catheterization decreased operating margin by 0.3% (P < .01), while each additional pressure sore prevention activity increased operating margin by
0.2% (P < .05), and each additional day of restorative
ambulation increased operating margin by 0.1% (P < .001).
However, facility-acquired restraints were not significantly
associated with financial performance. In terms of outcome
quality measures, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.
Every 10% increase in pressure ulcers and facility-acquired
contractures decreased operating margin by 0.4% and 0.1%,
respectively (P < .001). Similarly, each additional hospitalization per 365 nursing home resident days reduced operating margin by 0.2% (P < .05), and each additional 10
deficiencies decreased operating margin by 0.2% (P <
.001). The rehospitalization rate was not significantly associated with financial performance.
With respect to the control variables, larger nursing homes
experienced better financial performance. Similarly, those
located in markets with higher per capita income and higher
MA penetration experienced higher financial performance.

Discussion
The primary purpose of this study was to answer a fundamental question: Is there a business case for quality in the
nursing home industry? We examined the relationship
between quality and financial performance utilizing tenets
from economic theory and strategic management theory.
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Contrary to our hypothesis, higher LPN staffing intensity
and RN skill mix were associated with significantly poorer
financial performance. Literature suggests that nurse staffing
has an important independent impact on nursing home quality of care.59 Therefore, policy incentives, like incremental
payments for additional RN staffing, may be necessary to
encourage nursing homes to improve their skill mix. Nursing
home administrators, on the contrary, must ensure an appropriate mix of staff to provide the most effective and efficient
level of resident care possible. Nursing homes need to find
the appropriate mix of staff to facilitate financial viability
without compromising the quality of care.
We classified the process variables as poor (facilityacquired restraints and catheters) and good (pressure sore prevention and restorative ambulation). When examining poor
process measures, facility-acquired catheterization resulted in
lower operating margin; however, facility-acquired restraints
had no statistically significant impact. The use of restraints
has been declining in the US for years and has become a relatively rare event. Factors such as the Nursing Home Reform
Act of 1997 that mandated a reduction in restraint use within
nursing homes, and the public reporting of restraint use data
in Nursing Home Compare may have contributed to its sharp
decrease.60 As a result, restraints use may no longer play a
large role as a quality indicator.
Good process (pressure sore prevention and restorative
ambulation) resulted in better nursing home financial performance. Improved processes of care can result in greater productivity and lower costs as the facility is able to prevent
negative outcomes, such as pressure ulcers and ADL decline.
Treatment costs for these negative outcomes may exceed the
additional staffing costs engaged in improved processes of
care. Furthermore, the ability to offer the resident additional
value-adding services may also attract more residents and/or
a better payer mix. This process could be viewed as a potential differentiation strategy, which could lead to better financial performance.
Worse quality outcomes resulted in lower financial performance except for rehospitalizations, which was not significantly related to financial performance. This suggests
that at least for rehospitalizations, the revenue associated
with improvement was not sufficient to offset the additional
cost of preventing rehospitalizations. SNFs were not traditionally financially penalized for sending patients back to the
hospital if they needed additional care. Therefore, nursing
homes may have had little incentive to bear the cost of treating the resident in-house. However, with the introduction of
Value-Based Purchasing (2016) for skilled nursing care,
administrators will have to be mindful that excessive rehospitalizations may be financially burdensome.
There are several recent CMS initiatives that may
strengthen the business case for quality by tying revenues to
quality efforts. First, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduced the Hospital Readmissions Penalty Program in 2012,
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which penalizes hospitals for excess readmissions for certain clinical conditions. This is incentivizing hospitals to
develop preferred SNF networks with the goal of referring
patients for postacute care to nursing homes with better processes and outcomes of care.61 Second, The Protecting
Access to Medicare Act of 2014, which will come into effect
in 2019, introduces value-based purchasing payments for
skilled nursing homes based on quality measures and rates
of hospital readmissions.62 With the introduction of ValueBased Purchasing (2016) for skilled nursing care, nursing
homes that fail to deliver quality resident care face the risk
of lowered Medicare payments.63 Organizations will have a
financial incentive to improve quality outcomes as to avoid
financial penalties.
This study has several limitations. First, staffing data are
based on OSCAR/CASPER data, which is self-reported and
is not subject to regular audits. However, Grabowski et al64
have found a strong intersurvey agreement between OSCAR
and their own survey with respect to RN, LPN, and CNA
FTEs data. Nevertheless, future studies should use staffing
information based on payroll data, such as the data that are
now collected through CMS’ Payroll-Based Journal since
2016. Second, this study is limited to facilities with Medicare
residents. This results in the exclusion of facilities that are
exclusively private pay or Medicaid only. Finally, the outcomes used in this study were not risk-adjusted. However,
for many of the outcome measures, we were able to focus on
those that were acquired by the resident during the nursing
home stay, by subtracting the events that were present upon
nursing home admission. Notwithstanding these limitations,
this study is an important contribution to the existing literature on the relationship between quality and financial performance particularly as it suggests a business case for
quality.

Conclusions
In the face of increasing competition and restrictive payments
within the nursing home industry, nursing homes face the twin
challenge of delivering high-quality care while retaining
financial sustainability. Therefore, a detailed understanding of
the relationship between quality and financial performance is
imperative. If quality does in fact lead to better financial performance, nursing homes would be incentivized to deliver
high-quality care. Our results provide evidence of a positive
relationship between quality and financial performance. As
posited by Porter, firms may choose to pursue one of two distinct strategies to improve their financial performance over
competitors: cost leadership or product differentiation. Quality
of care provided by a nursing home could be the key behind
the successful implementation of either strategy. Producing a
high-quality of care may allow nursing homes to become more
efficient, or have higher revenues due to higher quality.
Therefore, our results suggest a business case for quality,

Weech-Maldonado et al
though more research would be required to establish precisely
the initiatives nursing homes can adopt to improve quality.
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